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A. Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this study was to expand the work
conducted under contract NAS 8-11415 and NAS 8-20224.
The first phase was concerned with single hydraulic
system using standard or non-redundant actuators for
thrust vector control of launch vehicles. The second
phase was concerned with various schemes for reliability
improvement including redundant actuators and hydraulic
systems. Both phases had as their primary consider-
ation reliability, weight, and cost while also consider-
ing actuator moment arm, hydraulic system pressure and
response. The work expansion in this study was to
extend the previous work into the coast, or on-orbit,
phase of the S-IV B stage operation using the S-IV B
stage hydraulic system design parameters. The study
was also to include the determination of reliability
figures for the system, including autopilot electronics
when the "majority vote actuator" is interfaced _ith
the autopilot electronics. The scope of the study
was limited to the considerations of systems using
linear servo actuators. The autopilot study was
limited to considerations of the existing S-IV B
autopilot with minimum modifications.
B. System Configurations InvestiEated
The following is a description of the autopilot
and hydraulics system configurations investigated.
C_e I
- Existing S-IV B autopilot
electronics and hydraulic system.
The existing S-IV B thrust vector
control system utilized a single
hydraulic system operating at
3500 psi with standard actuators
and a "triple" redundant autopilot
connected in a "pair and spare"
configuration. This configuration
w_ _ _ abasis ¢...........
of the other configurations.
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Case II - Majority vote actuator with the existing
S-IV B autopilot. This configuration
included the use of the existing S-IV B
pair and spare autopilot without the com-
parator circuit and the single hydraulic
system operating at 2500 psi with the
motorpump and engine driven pump in para-
llel redundant operation. In this
configuration the majority voting actuator
replaced the existing standard actuator
with the three autopilot channels
connected directly to the three majority
voting servovalves.
Case III- Majority vote actuator with additional
majority votingat the 50 MA Servo
Amplifier inthe S-IV B autopilot. In
this configuration the three channels of
the existing S-IV B autopilot would be
modified to majority vote the three
channels at the 50 MA servo amplifier
in addition to majority voting at the
actuator servovalves. The hydraulic
system would be Uhe same as described
incase II.
Case IV - Majority vote actuator with additional
majority voting at the D.C. amplifiers
in addition to majority voting at the
servo amplifier. This configuration
would be the same as Case III with
additional majority voting at the D.C.
amplifiers.
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The comparison of the overall system reliability
for the four system configurations investigated shows
that the configurations described in Cases II, III, and
IV all would result in approximately 49 percent fewer
failures than the existing Saturn S-IV B stage auto-
pilot and hydraulic system.
Since the unreliability of the hydraulic system
is much greater than the autopilot, the improvement
of the autopilot is masked out when the total system
reliability is considered.
The total system reliability improvement in
Cases II, III, and IV is due primarily to the hydraulic
system improvement resulting from the majority voting
actuator, operating the motorpump and engine driven
pump in paralled and reducing the system pressure
from 3500 to 2500 psi.
In each of the above cases with the exception
of Case II, the autopilot and the hydraulic systems
were examined separately with respect to their
reliability. Once the reliability and probability
of failures were determined for each subsystem the
autopilot and hydraulic systems were combined using
the appropriate reliability equations in determining
the overall system reliability. Case II posed a
special problem since the majority voting of the
autopilot output occurs at the majority voting servo-
valves. It was, therefore, necessary to include
the majority voting portion of the servovalves as





The autopilot investigation included the following
confiEurat ions.
i. Existing S-IV B autopilot with pair and
spare _redundancy.
2. Majority voting at the 50 MA servo
amplifier.
3- Autopilot with majority voting of the
50 MA servo amplifier and majority voting
of the D.C. amplifier.
The reliability analysis of the autopilot alone
showed that configuration (2) would produce 12 percent
fewer failures than the existing autopilot and
configuration (3) would produce 40 percent fewer
failures than the existing autopilot.
Hydraulic System Configuration
The following hydraulic system configurations
investigated were the same as in the previous study.
i. Single hydraulic system with standard
actuators (existing Saturn S-IV B con-
figuration).
2. Single system with majority vote actuator.
3. Dual system with standard actuator.
4. Dual system with majority vote actuator.
5- Dual system with tandem actuators.
The reliability of these system configurations
were determined for the coast or on-orbit phase of
the Saturn S-IV B stage operation using the existing
S-IV B stage design parameters.
The following table is a list of the total flight

























In addition, an investigation was made to determine
the reliability improvement of operating the existing
S-IV B stage hydraulic system with the motorpump and
engine driven pump in parallel redundant operation at
2500 psi. The computer results showed that this
configuration would produce approximately 13 percent
fewer failures over the existing S-IV B hydraulic
system configuration. The comparison between the
above system using majority voting actuators and the




This report is the final technical summary report for
Contract NAS 8-21041. The purpose of this study was to
extend the work performed under Contract NAS 8-20224 which
was concerned with the optimization of redundant hydraulic
systems and actuators for thrust vector control of launch
vehicles. This study extended the scope of work in the previous
study into the coast or on-orbit phase of the Saturn S-IVB
stage opezation. This study also includes the determination
of reliability of the thrust vector control system including
the autopilot electronics when the '_4ajority Vote Actuator"
is interfaced with the autopilot.
The general approach used in the study was to determine
the reliability of various autopilot configurations which
were compatible with a "Majority Voting Actuator" and compare
these configurations with the existing Saturn S-IVB stage
autopilot and hydraulic thrust vector control system.
In order to accomplish the work required for this study
the program was divided into two major tasks:
Task A - Autopilot Electronics
Task B - Thrust Vector Control Hydrauli c System
The objective of Task A was to determine the feasibility
of modifying the existing autopilot of the Saturn S-IVB
stage to be compatible with the '_ajority Vote Actuator."
An analysis was performed to determine the reliability of
the better autopilot configurations and these were then
compared with the reliability of the existing autopilot.
The objective of Task B was to determine the reliability of
the various thrust vector control hydraulic system configura-
tions investigated in the previous study program for the on-
orbit phase of the Saturn S-IVB operation. The final
objective was to compare the reliability of the existing
Saturn S-IVB thrust vector control system including the
autopilot electronics with a TVC system which utilizes
majority voting actuator and a compatible autopilot.
MCR-67-239
The general approach used in Task A was to examine
the existing Staurn S-IVB stage autopilot in order to
determine the feasibility of various autopilot configura-
tions which would be compatible with the Majority Vote
Actuator. A conceptual design was made for each scheme
and a reliability analysis performed on each autopilot
configuration, including the existing S-IVB autopilot.
The reliability analysis was performed on each autopilot
configuration using NASA supplied data on component failure
rates, environmental modifiers, and reliability equation
which permitted a direct reliability comparison with the
existing autopilot.
The approach used in Task B was to expand and modify
the computer program of the previous study to include the
coast or on-orbit phase of the Saturn S-IVB stage operation.
The input data to the computer program was updated using
NASA supplied information on environmental conditions,
operating times for coast and burn phases, and hydraulic
system design parameters for the S-IVB stage operation.
The reliability data derived from the computer program
for the hydraulic system was then combined with the various
autopilot configurations for final comparison with the
existing S-IVB system.
Included in this report are the following items:
i. Reliability comparison of the autopilot and
hydraulic system configurations investigated.
2. Description and analysis of each autopilot
configuration investigated including schematic
drawings.
3. Derivation and discussion of environmental factors
used in updating the computer program.
4. A listing of the IBM cards used in the computer




Autopilot and H2draulics S_stem Confi_xrations
The following is a description of each
configuration:
Case I - (See Figure l) This configuration is the
existing S-IV B pair and spare autopilot and
3500 psi single hydraulic system with standard
servo actuators.
Case II- (See Figure 2) The second configuration
is the existing S-IVB pair and spare autopilot
without the comparator circuit and the single
hydraulic system operating with the motorpump
and engine driven pump in parallel at 2500 psi.
In this configuration the majority voting
actuator replaced the standard actuator with
the three autopilot output channels connected
directly to the three servo valves of the
majority vote actuator.
Case III - (See Figure 3) This configuration is the
same as Case II except that the autopilot output
channels are majority voted at the 50 ma servo
amplifier. Then the three autopilot outputs
connected to the three servo valves of the majority
vote actuator. Thus the system has majority voting
twice, at the actuator and inside the autopilot at
the servo amplifier. The hydraulic system, like
Case II, was considered to be operating at 2500
psi with the motorpump and engine driven pump in
parallel redundant operation.
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Case IV - (See Figure 4) This configuration is the
same as Case III except that the autopilot is
majority voted twice instead of once. The system
then is majority voted three times: the first time
at the D.C. Amplifier, the second time at the 50 MA
servo amplifier, and again at the majority voting
servo valves of the actuator. The hydraulic system
like Cases II and III was at 2500 psi with motorpump
and engine driven pump in parallel redundant operation.
System Reliability Results
Table I shows the reliability and probability of
failures of the four system configurations investigated
for the 1st burn, coast, 2nd burn and total flight phase
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nl. DI C.SSION ANALYSIS
i.O AUTOPIL_
Four autopilot cases were examined with
respect to their reliabilities. The following
is a description of each case. The block diagrams
of all cases show two filters in series. This is
not the actual physical configurations (the filters
are really in parallel), but since a failure in
either filter would cause a channel failure, the
series fiction can be used for reliability study
purposes.
me Case_____Iis the existing autopilot which has
pair and spare redundancy (see Figure i).
be
C.
Case II is the autopilot with analog majority
voting at the 50 ma servo amplifier without the
comparator circuit (see Figure 3). The majority
vote 50 ma servo amplifier has a net parts count
addition of nine parts over the existing 50 ma
servo amplifier. The net parts added are three
transistors, one diode and five resistors (see
Figure 5, schematic of majority vote 50 ma
servo amplifier).
Case III is the autopilot with analog majority
voting of the 50 ma servo amplifier and of the
D.C. amplifier (see Figure 4). The 50 MA Servo
Amplifier is the same as that used in Case II.
The D.C. Amplifier has fourteen parts added for
Majority Voting purposes. This includes four tran-
sistors, eight diodes, and two resistors. (See
FiKure 6).
d. Case IV is the same as Case II except that no parts
have been added for majority voting. This case is to
get a better comparison between the reliabilities of











































1.1 Examination of Existin_ AutoDilot
The Saturn S-IVB Autopilot was examined so that
it could be modified for Majority Voting.
The familiarization of the circuitry by analysis
has taken the logical steps of 1) DC Analysis, 2) AC
Analysis, 3) Transfer Function Analysis, and 4)
Output Impedance, open loop, which is of special
significance when Majority Voting is being considered.
The analysis is covered in detail in Appendix A.
1.2 Majority Votin_ Autopilqt
A number of ways are suggested for the use of
Majority Voting on the Apollo Autopilot. First,
however, some theory is presented for Analog
Majority Voting. The way Majority Voting is
mechanized in the Titan III MOL Autopilot is also
presented as a working example.
1.2.1 Requirements for Majority Voting
Analog Majority Voting is a scheme for cancelling
out failures in the channel circuitry that precedes
the voting stage or "Voting Node". This is done
without the use of complicated sensing and switching
circuitry, whose high parts count could compromise
the reliability it is attempting to improve. Analog
Majority Voting is automatic. It is immune to
transient effects that might cause a switching
system to actuate. Transient malfunctions occuring
in any channel are voted out as readily as a constant
malfunction and the Majority Vote circuitry is
ready to take on another malfunction as soon as the
transient one has gone away.
The "Voting Node" is the common output (all outputs
attached) of the identical feedback amplifiers, each









• r CHA, NNEL 3
NOTE : AtV, PLIFIEI:2S NAVE N.IGH OPEN LOOP OUTPUT
IMPEDE'bANCES: I?'OIj i_OZ & P-'03
The theory of how Majority Voting works can be
seen from its operation under normal conditions,
that is with no failures in any channel and all
inputs the same, eI = e2 = e_. Associated with
the input voltage is an outpGt voltage:
-Rf
eo - R elm, which is common to all three
n
Majority Vote Amplifier outputs. However, all
three of the loop gains are not exactly equal.
Thus the output voltage will give rise to a
feedback voltage, which will satisfy only one
rof the Amplifiers - the one with the middle loop
gain. The highest gain amplifier will have too much
feedback for linear operation and will saturate with
the polarity of the output voltage. This is due to the
fact that the amplifiers have high Loop gains and a
very small signal (one or two millivolts) at the
summing junction will cause saturation. The lowest
gain Amplifier will go towards saturation in the
opposite direction and supply or accept the
saturation current o£ the saturated Amplifier_
22
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Sometimes this is done with the help of the
Amplifier that stays in its linear operation.
That is the middle gain amplifier is helping
to meet the demands of the saturated Amplifier as
well as drive the load. This can be done because
the M_jority<Vote Feedback Amplifiers have high
Open Loop output impedances, even when saturated.










_ _, WHERE RCL <.<. EL 4.4. R_ L
--_- VOTING NODE
NOTE : CL " CLOSED LOOP
OL = OPEN LOOP
In the Titan III Autopilot Majority Vote Amplifier
(See Appendix A, Figure A-6) the Open Loop output
impedance is made high by taking the output off of
the collectors of Q2 and Q3. The impedance is kept
high, even during Amplifier saturation by the zener
diodes CR1 and CR2, which never allow Q2 and Q3 to
become saturated. Thus the output transistors always
remain in their linear region of operation and their
collector output impedances are high.
The Titan III Autopilot Majority Vote Amplifier shown
is immune to single part failures, when it is being
23
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voted. This means that the channel up to the Voting
Node is not dependent upon the operation of any one
piece part. The graph of Figure A-7 in Appendix A
shows the voting operation of three Majority Vote
Amplifiers with three different inputs. When there
is a great difference between one signal and the
other two, the middle signal is chosen. The output
will be
e = -Rf e (middle). This same situation will
0 _ in
n
exist when there is a failure upstream of the Voting
Node that causes one Majority Vote Amplifier to go
hardover. The middle signal of the remaining two
will be the one that determines the output voltage.
However, when all three signals are very close to-
gether an averaging will take place:
• = -Rf (eI + e2 + e_)
o 3
n
The amount of dispersion of the input signals before
averaging ends is a function of the loop gain. The
higher the loop gain, the smaller the region of input
signal dispersion will be, when averring takes place.
1.2.2 Conceptual Design
The conceptual design started by devising
different schemes for using Majority Voting in
the Autopilot. This consisted of voting at the
Servo Amplifier, voting at the DC Amplifier, and a
combination of both (see Appendix A).
Several schemes were also considered for
modifying the 50MA Servo Amplifier and the DC
Amplifier to allow them to Majority Vote.
From technical meetings with NASA, the most
chosen with the following considerations:
24
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i. Least number of changes to the existing
circuitry
2. Emphasis to be placed on Majority Voting
the 50 MA Servo Amplifier
3. Other methods to be considered if time
permitted
1.2.3 Majority Voting Autopilot Configurations
1.2.3.1 Majority Voting the 50 MA Servo Amplifier
Since the Majority Voting technique, which
involves the fewest changes to the existing circuitry
is of special interest, this scheme was developed
further. (See Figure A-8, Schematic Diagram
Majority Vote Servo Amplifier No. 1). The biasing
and gain (open loop) were worked out for this case.
The open loop gain has been improved by almost an
order of magnitude. This would make it
possible to do away with the feedback trim pot.
If some adjustment was still desired, fixed resistors
could be used.
To accomplish this and achieve the design goals,
specifically those of high open loop .output
impedance and Voting Node protection, thirty-three
parts will have to be added when compared to
voting at the actuator only. When compared to the
present redundant configuration (pair and a spare),
this scheme would save 76 parts and allow voting
at two places - the actuator and the Servo Actuator.
1.2.3.1.1 Biasing - The biasing for the Servo Amplifier remains
the same as the present configuration up to Q14.
(See Figure A-3, Present Schematic Diagram 50
MAServo Amplifier). The collector of Q14 will have
O volts steady state instead of 1.2 volts. The
DC levels are recorded on the schematic. (See
Figure 5, final form schematlc diagram, 50 MA
Majority Vote Servo Amplifier)
MCR-37-, 239
1.2.3.1.2 Open Loop Gain (Nominal) - Present configuration vs.
new configuration:
Present Configuration:




i_ v/v 12.5 xlo -_ A/v
L
v
The open loop gain A_ remains the same. A_,
however, increases by almSst an order of magnitude.
The calculation of the new gain for A 2 follows:
26
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v5 - v5 v6
where V6
V5 - R + re e
B+I
and IO
V6 - R +r +_e e
B+I
thus I0 1.8K//20._K




-- = 12.5 x io-3 A/V
V5
The open loop gain (nominal) for the present configuration
is 491 x 103 A/A
The closed loop gain expression derived in Appendix A:
,k
k .' • ,
27
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N /N AIA 2
AI c g
- N_Ng Rs AIA 2 + A2R s + 1
Rf
which if Nf Rs




It is apparent that the approximation is better as
the values of A. and A_ become larger. Further-
. l L
more, slnce the closed loop gain is 1.667 x lO 3
A/A and the new open loop gain is 3450 x lO _ A/A,
this gives an accuracy of 0.5% from:
A
ACL = 1 + AB
1 AB
- B I+AB
Assuming a worst case open loop gain of 1/lO that
at nominal or 345 x i0_ A/A
_L = 1.667 x i_ (_4_ x 103)_1.667 x I0
1 + (345 x 103) C 1 3)1.667 x lO
3 2O6
ACL = 1.667 x 10- 1 + 206




Thus with an accuracy calculated for the Amplifier of
0.5% and an accuracy specification of 2%, it is feasible
to eliminate the feedback pot.
Votin_ Node Protection, 50 ma Servo Amplifier -
The first scheme for _ting node pr@tection
_sresented, Appendix A took twelve (12) extra _rts.
ee Figure 7 Voting Node Protection). Another
method will now be presented which affords the same
protection against single piece part failures, but
requires only six extra parts. In Figure 7 , Q1 along
with R1 and R2 furnished a redundant output transistor
which took over the drive if Q2 happened to short out.
This prevented the voting node from being loaded
excessively. This requirement can be met with a
savings of six parts by using two FET's in series with
the output. (See Figure 8 , Voting Node Protection,
Revised). Here the I_ characteristic of the FET's
are used to restrict _q_ load closer to what it
would be during normal operation. Thus, for our
application In_ _ (min) would have to be greater than
50 ma and I_Tmax) kept as low as practical,
perhaps i0 _'_ 15 ma above IDS S (min).
This method also allows us to eliminate CR2 as
excessive loading, if Q2 fails (collector to base),
is prevented by the FET's.
The final form of the 50 MA Servo Amplifier with




































1.2.3.2 Majority Vote DC Amplifier
Majority Voting the DC Amplifier was given last
priority in the study. Majority Voting the DC
Amplifier does not have the importance that
Majority Voting the Servo Amplifier has. When
votimg the DC Amplifier, only that unit is protected.
(See Figure A-l). This makes it all the
more important for the voting mechanization to be as
simple as possible, for any advantage to be gained by
voting. Added to this consideration was the fact
that if the same majority voting technique first used
on the Servo Amplifier was used on the DC Amplifier, quite
a few parts would have had to be added. (See Appendix
A for first method of Voting the Servo Amplifier). This
would have amounted to 38 parts per Amplifier or 114
parts added in all. Thus a new method of majority voting
was looked for. One method discovered would be very
simple - requiring ozily slight modification to the present
DC Amplifier. This involves the addition of two resis-
tors per Amplifier. A resistor would be placed between
each Amplifier differential output and the voting node,
which is also the point that feedback is taken off. This
method would probably not work for the Servo Amplifier
















A thorough investigation of this method was
not made due to the lack of time. However, it was
felt that there might be problems (such as output
stage saturation) so a conservative approach was
taken. The Majority Vote DC Amplifier final
form uses the_same techniques as the Majority Vote
Servo Amplifier (see Figure 5_ The one exception
is the use of resistors before the Voting Node to
increase the open loop output impedance, instead
of taking the output off collectors. The parts added
were not as numerous as first considered necessary,
(14 additional parts instead of 38per amplifier).
The Majority Vote DC Amplifier of Figure 6 was
the configuration used in the reliability study.
• 33
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Reliability Study of Autopilot
Reliability of Existing Autopilot (Case I)
Case I - The probability of failures equation
was derived for the existing pair and spare
Autopilot from =_ truth _-_u_e of _a_ur_......... _a_d
successes. The questionable cases were considered
failures so the derived equation is conservative.
The symbols used in the truth table have the
following meanings:
Q = probability of failure (O) of the Autopilot
channels exclusive of the comparator circuit.
This stands for failure of the drive, reference,
or spare channel. Also referred to as the
unreliability of the autopilot channels.
Qc = probability of failure of the comparator
curciut (or unreliability).
Also, R, probability of success (1) of autopilot
channels = l-q.
And R_, probability of success (1) of comparator
circuit = I-Q c.
The truth table shown in Table II was used in
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35
MCR-67-239
Combining the failure terms from the truth table the probability
of failure equation for the pair and spare is:
Qo_o!_Q3%+Q3(1_%)+_2%(1_Q)+2QR1-Q_(_-%)
+ e _(l - Q)2
-m2+-m_--Q3__2% ÷Q3_
QcW,zmel: 2(Q2+ e Qc) - (Q3+ _Qa%) + Q3Qc
For actual calculations the last term was dropped because of
being negligible, giving:
Qchannel = 2(Q2 + Q QC ) - (Q3 + 3Q2_)
This equation is used to determine the reliability for
Case I by summing the probabilities of failure for the three
phases of flight. The probability of failure for each phase
of flight is calculated from failure rates furnished from IBM.
Electrical failure rates (_ e) were multiplied by an environment
modifier (K) and then multiplied by the time of the phase of
l" ef ight (T). Thzs gives an unreliability _ e K T, which is summed
with an unreliability for mechanical failurese_mKmT, giving an
unreliability _6r the phase of flight which is Q x-tO "U. The
same operation is used for calculating QC' the comparator circuit
probability of failure. The equation for Q _ _ is then used
to determine the probability of failure forC_ne _Itch or yaw
channel for the existing pair and spare redundancy.
36
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1.3.2 Reliabilit,y of Autopilot with Majority ,Vote Servo Amplifier
(Case II)
Case II - The general equation for majority vote
probability of failure can be derived from the
following truth table of failures and successes.
This equation was used for Case II (as well as
Case III and Case IV), where the pitch or yaw
channel has three identical channels, any two
of which need to be good for a success.
TABLE llI Truth Table, Majority Vote
Terms for Probability




















Combining the failure terms from the truth table, the
probability of failure equation for majority voting is:
= Q3+ _2(I_ Q)
= 3Q2 . 2Q 3
37
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1.3.2 Case II - (Continued)
For Case II (see Figure 3), this equation is used to
determine the total channel probability of failure. The
channel unreliability Q differs numerically from that
used in Case I by the addition of the unreliabilities of the
nine parts added to enable the 50 MA Serve Amplifier to
majority vote. Otherwise: the Q's are determined in the
same way as that used in Case I.
1.3.3 Reliability Analysis of Ma.jority Votin_ at the Serve
Amplifier and D.C. Amplifier (Case III)
Case III- The same basic majority vote equation for
probability of failure is used in Case III as in Case
II. Case III, however, is voted on twice, at the DC
Amplifiers and at the 50 ma Serve Amplifiers (see Figure
_). The total channel unreliability is therefore a
summation of the two unreliabilities for the two parts
of the channel. The Q for the DC Amplifier has the
additional unreliabilities of the fourteen parts added
to majority vote that stage (see Figure 6, Schematic of
Majority Vote DC Amplifier).
1.3.4 Reliability Analysis of Autopilot with Majority Votin_
at the 50 ma Serve Amplifier - Alternate Configuration
Case IV - This case is the same as Case II except that the
parts count is the same as that for Case I. That is Q
for the channel is numerically the same as Case I. The
channel probability of failure, however, is determined by
the majority vote equation
% 3a2 2a3
This case was calculated primarily for purposes of comparison.
It is not unrealistic. Circuits have been proposed (See
Appendix A) that could vote the Serve Amplifier with an
actual reduction of the parts count over that of the
present Amplifier. This though, would entail more changes
to the Serve Amplifier than that shown in Figure 5.
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1.4 AutoDilot Configurations Reliability Results
Table IV shows the reliability and probability of
failures for the four cases investigated for the first
burn, coast, second burn, and total flight phases of
the Saturn S-IVB stage operation. Comparing the
different cases to Case I, the existing Autopilot
configuration (pair and spare), there is a four
per cent decrease in failures by using the Case II
scheme of majority voting at the 50 MA Servo Amplifier.
By looking at Cases I and IV a better comparison can be
made of the reliabilities between the two techniques
of redundancy, pair and spare and majority voting.
Case IV uses a 50 MAServo Amplifier with the same
parts count as the one used in Case I. The majority
vote system shows a 12 per cent decrease in failures
over the pair and spare redundancy.
Case III, which uses majority voting both at the
Servo Amplifier and at the DC Amplifiers, has the same
Servo Amplifier circuitr_ as Case I. To vote the DC
Amplifier an additional fourteen parts are needed.
Along with these parts are the nine added to majority
vote the Servo Amplifier. Despite these added parts,
Case III showed a 40 per cent decrease in failures
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2.0 HYDP_ULIC SYST_R FOR THRUST VECTOR CON_I'ROL
In the previous study program (Reference 1) the
hydraulic system components and various redundant actuators
were analyzed at the piece part level. Equations were
derived describing the generic failure rats of each com-
ponent. These equations were further classified into
separate catagories depending on the type of failures
and their effect upon various redundancy schemes. The
component Generic Failure Rate equations were derived





A computer program was developed to perform the necessary
• computations which determined the weight, cost, and
probability of failures during ground check-out, engine
start, and flight for the following hydraulic system
oonfi@urations.
Single System, Standard Actuator
Single System, Majority Vote Actuator
Dual System, Standard Actuator
Dual System, Majority Vote Actuator
Dual System, Tandem Actuator
The computer program performed the above calculations
for various ranges of hydraulic system pressures, engine
gimballing torques and actuator moment arms. A sample
calculation was performed using the hydraulic system
design parameters for the Saturn S-IV B thrust vector
control system. The results were presented in Reference i.
In order to arrive at the reliability of the hydraulic
thrust vector control system, the approach wa= to deter-
mine the reliability or probability of failure of the
previous system configurations for various time phases
depending on the system operating mode during the coast
or on-orbit phase of _he S-r; B operation. "_is approach
required the modification and use of the computer
program developed during the previous study.
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The computer program of the previous study was written
in Fortran II-D language to be used primarily on an
IBM 1620, Mark II Computer augmented with an IBM 1311
Disk Storage Drive. Due to the size of the program and
the limited storage capacity of the IBM 1620 Computer
it was decided to convert the computer program for the
GE ll30 Computer using Fortran IV language while in-
corporating the necessary modifications.
In modifying the computer program, it was
necessary to change the reliability equations stored
in the computer which were included in reference l.
In the previous study, the conversion of failure rates
to probability of failure were accomplished through the
following approximation:
Q=I-R
Q = i - •
Q = 1 _ t._.. (for _ <.01)
Q = 1 - (GFR)(Kop)(KF)(KA) t
10 -6
where R = Reliability
Q = The probability of failure
t = Operating time during various mission phases
= Mean-time-to-failure
GF R = Generic failure rate
KA = The application factor which takes into account
the application of the piece part with respect
to the component during component operation.
= The system function modifiers which adjusts the
failure rate taking into account the function
of the component with respect to the launch
vehicle during periods of operation being consid-
ered
Kop = The operating mode factor which adjusts the




For an_ hydraulic system thrust vector control
operation during the coast phase of the launch vehicle
the generic failure rate (GF R) and the application
factor (KI) do not change from those during powered
flight. The remaining problem therefore was to deter-
mine the environmental operating mode factor (Kop) , the
system function modifier _, and the time (t) in
seconds of the various mission phases where a signifi-
cant change in external environments occurs. The
analysis and values derived for these factors for the
Saturn S-IVB Stage operation are discussed in Appendix
B of this report.
Using the new values of KnD, Kr, and t, the component
reliability equations F and the'unreliability equations
Q were rewritten and reprogrammed into the computer.
Since the probability of failure is a function of
the Kop factor, there is a difference between the two
study results of approximately a factor of 4.
Another significant difference is between the
probability of failure during ground testing phase of
the two study programs. During the conversion of the
computer program the G.E. 1130 computer picked up an
error in the original computer program equations. The
nature of the error was an "undefined variable" in one
of the ground test probability of failure equations.
It is suspected that the IBM 1620 computer failed to
pick up the error and instead picked an arbitrary number
for the undefined variable and continued with the
computations.
In the previous study program the external leak
failure modes of the majority vote servo valves were
considered catastrophic in nature, however in actuality
the present design of the majority vote actuator
ports the servo valve homsing ca_rity and the piston
rod leakage to the return portion of the hydraulic
system. In the present study program the equations of
the majority vote actuator were modified such that the
servo valve and piston rod leakage were not considered
catastrophic. The result is a significant improvement




After the checkout of the new computer program
was completed, the new environmental factors were
programmed into the computer along with the design
parameters of the Saturn S-IVB hydraulic system.
The results of a sample calculation for the S-IVB Stage
hydraulic system is summarized in Table V. This
table shows the probability of failures during ground
test, countdown, engine start, first burn, coast, and
second burn phases of the S-IVB operation in addition
to the total probability of failure from first ignition
thru the end of the second burn flight phase. The
total probability of failure includes the first engine
ignition, first burn, coast, second engine ignition and
the second burn phases and was determined by the
summation of the probability of failures during each
phase of flight. It was assumed that the environmental
conditions during the second engine ignition were not
significantly different from those during first ignition
so that the probability of failures during both engine
ignitions were considered to be the same.
The results of the S-IVB operation obtained
from the previous study program are presented in Table
VI in order to compare the results of the two study
programs.
In comparing the results of the computer programs
for the Saturn S-IVB Stage hydraulic system there is a
significant difference between the probability of
failures during engine start and first burn calculated
in the previous program and those calculated in this
program. This difference is attributed to the fact that
the KO_ factor used in the previous study was 1CO0 for all
hydraulic components which is typical for the Titan III
upper stage vehicles whereas the KnD factors derived

















On April 20, 1967, a meeting was held at the George C.
Marshall Space Flight Center National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Huntsville, Alabama, between Martin and
NASA personnel to review the program schedule and the tech-
nlcal performance of the study program to date. At this time
the Martin Marietta Corporation was asked to investigate the
possibility of including the following additional effort
in the study:
a. Determine the reliability of the Saturn S-IV
Stage hydraulic system utilizing a single hydraulic system
and majority vote actuators with the existing engine driven
pump and the motor pump operating in parallel during the
first and second burn phase of flight. The reliability
of this system would then be compared with hydraulic
system configurations already investigated.
b. Determine the reliability of hydraulic systems
already under investigation for the S-IVB operation using
a system pressure of 2500 psi and the same actuator piston
area.
The reason for this request is that there is a strong
possibility that the Saturn S-IVB Stage hydraulic system
will use the three torque motor majority vote actuators in
place of the present Standard actuators. Consideration is
also being given to operating the existing engine driven
pump and the motor pump in parallel during all powered
phases of the S-IVBBtage operation as an added improvement
in reliability. Use of the three torque motor majority vote
actuators will result in an increase in system internal
leakage since three valve first stages per actuator are
required instead of only one for the present actuators. In
order to compensate for this, consideration is being given




The technical approach to accomplish the additional
effort was to rerun the computer program and change
the input data cards such that the operating pressure is
2500 psi. Since the actuator moment arm and piston area
are to remain the same it will be necessary to reduce the
engine torque proportionally with the reduction of system
operating pressure. Under this approach the results of
the computer program is conservative since the
computer program was derived assuming that the hydraulic
system components are designed for the particular operating
pressures derived. In the case of the proposed change in
the hydraulic system the existing components which were
designed for an operating pressure of 3650 psi would be
operated at 2500 psi which, from a reliability standpoint,
is an improvement since the components would be operated
at a much lower stress level than originally designed.
The computer program output does not reflect the
reliability improvement resulting from lower stress levels.
However, for purposes of comparative evaluation, it is
believed that the existing computer program is adequate.
In order to evaluate the effects on system
reliability of reducing the hydraulic system pressure from
3500 to 2500 psi and operating the motor pump and engine
driven pump in parallel, a comparison was made of the
following hydraulic system configurations.
le Existing Saturn S-IVB stage hydraulic system
operating at 3500 psi with the primary
hydraulic power derived from the engine
driven pump.
. Existing Saturn S-IVB stage hydraulic
system operating at 3500 psi with the
engine driven pump and motor pump operating
in parallel.
In order to accomplish this investigation the
computer program was modified to take into account
the motor pump and engine pump operating in parallel.
In the third configuration the engine torque input
data to the computer program was reduced proportionally
_o the reduction uf _j_m pressure such .... the
actuator piston area and system flow would be the same
as in the other two configurations.
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Table VII shows the reliability and probability
of failures of the three hydraulic system configurations
investigated. It should be noted that the reliability
and probability of failures for the configuration in which
the system pressure was reduced to 2500 psi is
conservative since the computer program results are for
a system which was specifically designed of a 2500 psi
system. In case of the Saturn S-IVB proposed change the
hydraulic system was specifically designed for 3500 psi
operation and would operate at 2500 psi. The results
shown in this case does not show the reliability improvement

















Based on the analysis and results of this study, it was
concluded that:
io The probability of failure of the existing S-IVB auto-
pilot could be reduced by 44% by modifications which
would allow majority voting of the three existing
channels at the output of the D.C. amplifier and the
50 ma servo amplifier.
. The probability of failure of the existing autopilot
and hydraulic system could be reduced by 49% by replacing
the existing actuators with Majority Voting actuators, and
operating the hydraulic system at 2500 psi with the
motor pump and engine driven pump in parallel operation.
This reliability improvement is essentially independent
of the autopilot configuration investigated.
. When considering the reliability of the combined auto-
pilot and hydraulic system the contribution of the
autopilot improvement is not apparent due to the
large difference in the reliability of the two basic
sub-systems.
. The autopilot configuration, which would cause the least
impact and cost to the total system, is the one which
deletes the comparator and switch circuits of the
existing autopilot and connecting thethree autopilot
output pitch and yaw channels to the three servo valves
of the Majority Voting actuator.
. The weight and cost of the hydraulic system did not
change as a result of the expansion of the scope of
work in this study; therefore, the weight and cost
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1.0 ANALYSIS OF EXISTING SATURN S-IVB AUTOPILOT
The examination part of the study was to become aware of
features peculiar to the system as well as detailed analyses
of circuitry. Some of the more salient features of the channels
studied are: l) The use of Balanced Differential input lines
for rate and attitude signals from the A/P inputs through half
of the 50 MA Servo Amplifiers. This takes the attitude signals
on Balanced Lines through the DC Amplifiers, the Filters and
into the Servo Amplifier. The rate signals come into the A/P
on Balanced Lines and go through filters where the attenuation
is changed in the second S-IV B burn mode (Sequence S-IV B:
First Burn Mode, Coast Mode, Second Burn Mode). 2) The use
of separate power supplies in each Amplifier to achieve the
desired isolation and reliability, The power supplies have
+ 28 VDC inputs for the 8ervo Amplifier and a + 28 VDC input
_or the DC Amplifier. The DC supplies consist of inverters,
rectifiers, and regulators. The output voltages are + 20 VDC
for the transistor circu/ts of the Servo Amplifier an_ 60 V_
for the DC Amplifier. A square wave voltage of 1 K HZ is supplied
for the Magnetic Amplifier in the Servo Amplifier. 3) The use
of Push-Pull, Full Wave Magnetic Amplifiers for isolation of
the many inputs for low drift, and most important, for differ-
ential summing. 4) The use of sensor redundancy - ',Pair and
a Spare" - at the channel output. A Servo Amplifier, which
drives the actuator, is compared to another Servo Amplifier.
If a malfunction occurs in the two Amplifiers being compared,
a third Amplifier is switched into the channel to drive the
actuator. 5) The use of quad redundant relays at the critical
point in the front end of the channel, before it is broken out
into three redundant paths.
Figure A_ shows the block diagram of that part of the
Apollo Autopilot which the study covers, which is the S-IV B
Gimballed Engine Actuator channels.
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i.i _O MA Servo Amplifier - The 50 MA Servo Amplifier is
used to drive the Gimballed Engine Actuators. It has a
balanced differential input and a single ended output, which
is voted on in the comparator circuit ("pair and a spare").
The Servo Amplifier features magnetic summing of attitude and
rate signals into a push-pull magnetic amplifier front end.
The rest of the amplifier is made up of differential transistors
and driver stages. Each Servo Amplifier has its own power
supply, furnishing 1 K HZ to the magnetic amplifier gate
windings and + 20 V to the transistors. (See Block Diagram,
Figure A-2)
I.i.i DC Analysis - The DC Analysis was accomplished
by starting with _12, since the base on the right is
approximately O V. This establishes the DC volts on the
base of Q8 as approximately 0 V and determines the collector
currents of _A and Q6B_ (See Schematic, Figure A-3)
1.1.2 AC Analysis - The forward loop gain, I /I. will























































































































22 to 32 Vdc, 2.9 watts maximum
(28 volts nominal)
33.6 or 48.4 Vdc, positive or negative
7.4 Vdc, positive and negative
1.1 milliamperes per turn (!2%)
Not more than 0 _ 30 microamperes
into 450 turns per stack for full
output signal
Greater than 40,000 ohms from O to
2O Hz
A full output swing between 0 and 50
milliamperes, positive and negative,
as developed across a lO0-ohm valve
load
The 3 db down frequency is 55 (25) Hz
With no input signal applied, null
offset is less than 0 - 20 mV
referred to input
Not less than 20,000 ohms and isolated
by at least 150,O00 ohms from the
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Magnetic Amplifier Open Loop Gain - The Magnetic
Amplifier is used in the front end of the 50 ma Servo
Amplifier (see schematic, Figure A-3). It is of the
full-wave, push-pull variety which has good drift
characteristics with variations in temperature and
supply voltage. The supply voltage is 1K Hz
Square Wave . The cores are biased to
saturate (fire) at approximately 90 °. With no
signal in, the two cores saturate at the same time
and the resulting output voltage across eachdummy
resistor (619/L) is of the same magnitude, but of
opposite polarity. Thus there is no output. When
there is an input signal, one core is aided by the
flux due to the input and will saturate earlier.
The other core is opposed by the flux due to the
input and will saturate later. The sum total of the
outputs across the dummy resistors Will now be a
voltage pulse of the polarity corresponding to the
core which saturated first. The change from null
was brought about by an earlier saturation of a
core (push) and a later saturation of an opposing
core (pull). t
__ RDI GI9
0 0 _ V_























1.1.2.1.1 Derivation of Open Loop Gain:
The transfer function for the Magnetic
Amplifier will be derived for a change of




The change of voltage out can be expressed in
terms of a change of flux in the core
fedt= Ng_ e_
or eat = Ng_g
Vavg = eel'S2 f
At
The change of flux can also be expressed in










e At = K NgN c _I c
• t
Vavg =





Thus G =_'av_ = N K 2fN
c g
avg
Calculation of the Open Loop Gain:
The cores used in the 50 ma Servo Amplifier
are Magnetic Metals 47A8702. The core gain K,
since it is push-pull, is twice that for the
single ended case derived above.
K = _ = 2AB A
N AI AH i
C C
_B can be obtained from the Constant Current Flux
&N
Reset Data (CCFR) and is:




AH 2 - a_
a _ 81oo




Gauss _ f 10 -6`Oersteds _
Webers/C_
Ampere-Turns/CM )
o.o 28 2 )
cM
= 6.82 x 10 -5 Webers
Ampere-Turn
And the Transfer Function is
Vo
-------= N K2f NI c c
= (450)(6.82x io-5)(2 x 1o3)(36o)







Magnetic Amplifier - There is some disagreement with the
NASA approach in determining the open loop gain Vin/Iin.
For the time being the NASA Value will be used.
(It is the smaller)
V°
zm _ 1645 Volt_.___s
Iin Amp




Assuming _PwI = _R"2 and R = ReI e2
V2 = VOI
V2 : Bib2 _
ib : iI _K
3K + 20K + 2(h. + R )
le e
: iI 3K
3K + 20K + 2 (II.4K + 460(245))













Gain V3/V 2) of Differential Stage _lO, %ll
V3 = RL // lOK + (hie(Q12) + B_) // (hie(QS) + B_)






Gain V4/V 3) of Differential Stage Q12
V4 _ // hie (Q14)
V3 - tel + re2 + RB
B + 1
Gain V_/V 4) of Driver Stage 414










Gain I_V_) of Ql5, Q7, and Q9
I0 V6 V7 l_!__
V5 - V5 V6 , RL
where V6
B+I
and V0 the output transfer function has a similar formula
then IO 1.99 140 1
2.0---715--5
= 6.32 x 10 -3
1.1.2.7 The forward loop gain (I_I N) for the nominal case:
I0









AI - Vf I A2 = I0
A I - IoRs_ A2 = I0
N
_ AIA2I N





N/Ng RS AIA 2 + A2R S + 1
Rf
I0 NC Rf Nf RS
AI- IN _ Nf _s if_---_
g
Nf _S
N Rf AIA2Io - RsA2I 0 = I0
g
Vf = IoR s
AIA 2 >> RsA 2 + 1




Using the approximation with the range of feedback
resistance of 21K + 0 to 2K, the gain range is:
A1 450 21K to 23K 1.575 x 103 to 1.725 x lO 3
= 300 20 =
This agrees with the spec which requires 50 MA out
for 30 # a into the 450 turns. That is:
Io = 50 x lO -3 1.667 x lO 3
30 x 10 -6 =
1.2 DC Amplifier - The DC Amplifier is used in the front
end of the Gimballed Engine Actuator Channels to
amplify the Pitch and Yaw Attitude Error Signals
(See Figure A-l), The attitude signals are carried
on isolated balanced lines (double ended) both into
and out of the Amplifier. Each Amplifier has its
own power supply with _ 28 VDC inputs and a 60 VDC
output for the Amplifier Circuits, which are all
transistors. Feedback and input resistors are used
to set the voltage gain at a predetermined value from
0.5 to 25.0 (See Figure A-4 for open loop block
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1.2.1 DC Analysis of DC Amplifier - The DC Analysis of
the DC Amplifier (see schematic, Figure A-5)
will be accomplished by writing the DC equations
in terms of the collector current of Q6 (I_)
and the emitter current of Q9 (I.). This kill
yield two equations in two unknowns and all
currents and voltages of the Amplifier can then
be solved.
Starting with I_ and the voltage (V_) due to
it, at the junction of the 200_ emitter




1.2.1 DC Anal_sis of DC Amplifie r - (Continued)
a. DC Anal_sis of DC Amplifier - (Continued)
V3 = 60 - 13 (3.9K) - 0.6
1
17 = I-_K (V3 + 0.6)
iOO---_i 17 (33K) + 0.6 - 0.6and I1 =
1 i____ (V3 + .6)(33K)Ii - lOOK II3Kor
1
- lOOK 60 - I3(3.9K) - 0.6 + O. (33K)
Thus I1 = O.175 x 10 -3 - 0.Ol14 13 (i)
Now starting with Il and finding it in terms of 13
by using the collector currents of the following
stages:
(I2 + I_) 8OK + I2/2 (I.SK) + 0.6
I1 = 60 210K
(2)
Solving for 12 in terms of I3:




12 -- 13 +iNE
Solving for 15 in terms of I_
3.9K (60 _- I3(3.9K) - 0.6)
15 = I3 -'_ - ll3K
1 1 59.4




Thus 12 + 15 = 13 3.9 ( _ + _) + 1-_
= 1.23 13 - 0.460 x l0 -3
1.2
+ - z15 
And _I2 = O.111 13 + 0.0333 x lO -3
2
Substituting back into equation (2)
ii 96.2 98.7 i3
- 210K 210
I1 = 0.459 x lO -3 - 0.470 13 (3)
This givestwo equations in two unknowns (1) and (3)
I1 = 0.175 x i0 -3 - O.Oll4 13 (I)
I1 = 0.459 x lO -3 - 0.470 13 (3)
which solved simultaneously yield:
13 = 0.62 ma
I1 = 0.168 ma




14 = I3 = 0.155 ma
T
16 = 0.605 ma
= 0.509 ma
With these currents, the transistor collector to





1.2.2 AC Analysis - The forward loop gain (VdVin) will be
















// (hie(_O) + BI_) // (hie(QJl, QZ2) + _)














= 180 x i0"
1.2.3 Transfer Function Analysis
Rf
R E ' _. E




if E ' _ 0 and I ' # 0
n n
En-En - n I ' n
-- n -
Rn Rf Rn'
Now E'A = EO
So Eo/A EJA E0 Eo/A -En
-- + + _- = ----
n
















if -_f R ' n Rf
For the differential case where
En = V1 - V2 and E O = VIO - V20
Vl O = _ Rf _ Rf
--f-v I, V2o = v2
n n




=_--- (V1 - V2)
n
Thus Vlo - V20 -Rf
VI - V2 - Rn
2.0 T III MOL MAJORITY VOTE AMPLIFIER - The T III MOL
majority vote amplifier is shown schematically in
Figure A-6. Figure A-7 shows that variation of the
majority voted output as a function of two input
signals close together with a varying third signal.
The curves shown were obtained from laboratory tests
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3.0 MAJORITY VOTE CONFIGURATIONS FOR APOLLO AgTOPILOT
i i J i i
Suggestions for Majority Voting the Apollo Autopilot
will be made, which could affect both the _dance and the
Rate Signals (see Block Diagram, Figure A-I ).
An obvious first choice for Hajority Voting, when
using the Majority Vote Actuator, is to eliminate the Servo
Amplifier Circuitry and send all three signals from the
Servo Amplifiers to the Actuator. This would handle all
single failures in the Autopilot.
If more reliability is desired, then Majority
Voting can be done inside the Autopilot. One choice





A different arrangement of
feedback would not solve our problem as it is
the Open Loop impedance that has to be high.
This is due to the fact that when the Amplifiers
saturate, they are operating virtually without
feedback. As the Servo Amplifiers exist now_
feedback is arranged to boost the Closed Loop
output impedance, but this does not help
Majority Voting.
Another choice for Majority Voting could be
the DC Amplifiers. This would not vote out any
failures in the Rate channel, but would protect
the DC Amplifiers. The system could then
tolerate a failure of a DC Amplifier and another
failure downstream up to the actuator Voting
Node. The same comments made before about
boosting the Open Loop output impedance would
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If Voting took place at the DC Amplifier and the
Servo Amplifier (as well as at the Actuator),
then the failures that could be tolerated would
be a IX] Amplifier plus a Relay or Filter or
Servo Amplifier, plus an Actuator. The reliability
figures for that configuration will probably not
show much improvement over the configurations
mentioned previously.
Somewhat outside the scope of this Study, but
another place that voting could occur, would
be inside the Control Signal processor. The
Amplifiers in this unit that are voted on with
a Comparator Circuit, could probably be Analog
Majority voted, or the signals could be sent to
the Autopilot and amplified and voted on there.
This would eliminate the quad redundant relays
as well as the Comparator Circuit in the Comtrol




Thruster channels. Majority Voting could
probably be used to advantage, however, these
areas are not to be considered in this study.
A possibility of improving the number of piece
part failures that the system could tolerate,
would be to increase the number of Amplifiers
voted. Such as:
INPUT F--- CHANKIEL I
;-- CHAklNEL 2
;-- 0HANNEL 3
It is doubtful if four Majority Vote Amplifiers
of the Titan III variety would operate properly
under normal conditions. Five Amplifiers
probably would, but then you would have the peculiar
situation of being capable of withstanding one or
three Amplifier failures but not two Amplifier
failures. These problems could probably be designed




This section of the Appendix will cover the conceptual
design configurations of the Majority Vote 50 MA Servo
Amplifier. Two general configurations will be considered for
Analog Majority Voting the 50 MA 5ervo Amplifier. The first
keeps the two feedback loops of the present Servo __mplifier and
the second has only one feedback loop. Two output circuits are
also presented as being able to meet the design goals in a
number of circuit configurations. These are discussed and compared
with considerations of Open Loop Output Impedance, Open Loop
Gain, and Piece Parts Count. The more promising circuits are
presented in conceptual schematic form for the full Majority
Vote Servo Amplifier. The protection of the "voting node" is
then discussed, this being applicable to any of the various
circuits for Majority Voting. The voting node is the common
output point of the three voting amplifiers, that is
where the three outputs are physically attached to one another.
The three choices for a Majority Vote Servo Amplifier
boil down to this: the more changes made, the more piece
parts saved.
4.1 Goals for Design of Ma_orit_ Vote Servo Amplifier -
a. Increase Open Loop Output impedance, even when
the amplifier is saturated.
b. Protect voting node from single piece part failure
or power supply failure.
C@ Maintain present performance levels of Open
Loop Gain, Current Drive, Null Offset, and
Dynamics Response.
do Low piece parts count - Design Goal of keeping




This would eliminate the entire Comparator Circuit
(109 parts) when the Servo Amplifier is Majority
Voted.
e. At least one alternate way of Majority Voting to be
developed as study progresses.
Two Feedback Loop
The first general configuration to be considered for











Here the two feedback loops are kept and the veti_
is done at the power amplifier output. The differences
between this method and the method normally used for
Majority Voting are: 1) there are two feedback loops
while normally there is only one, 2) the load is much
greater for the SerTo Amplifier, that is much more driTe
capability will be needed, and 3) current feedback is
used instead of the usual voltage feedback. This means
that the place where feedback is taken is not the same as
the voting node. The _otin E node and the point feedback




A good way to increase the output impedance is to drive the
load from the collectors and the complimentary symmetry
arrangement lends itself nicely to the job. The first out-




Using representative values for the components, a gain of







This circuit could be placed at the output of the
Servo Amplifier (see Figure A-3, 50 maServo Amplifier). This,
however, would be a waste of parts as well as more difficult
to stabilize. A better place to use the circuit would be at
the collector of Q14 and eliminate Q15, QT, and Qg. (See
Figure A-8, Majority Vote 50maServo _m_!ifier). This
would eliminate nine parts and add fourteen parts so that for
the three Majority Vote Amplifiers there would be a net of
fifteen parts added. However, since the entire comparator
circuit was eliminated (109 parts), there would be a net
elimination of 94piece parts.
Other considerations of this circuit change are:
ae Open Loop Gain - This will be increased some, perhaps
as much as two to three times. This will probably
necessitate adjustment of the stabilizing circuitry.
It could also mean higher reliability by the
elimination of the 2K feedback adjustment resistor,
which is used to set the closed loop gain. If some
closed loop gain adjustment was still desired, a
higher open loop gain would make the use of fixed
resistors more practical.
b@ Drift or Null Offset - Should not be affected very
much since there is at least a gain of 105 preceding
the output circuit. However, since the closed loop
gain is high (1667 ma/ma), any contribution to offset
of the output circuit could be minimized by using




















































Ce Drive Characteristics - Since the closed loop output
impedance will be increased considerably (about 103
x the former closed loop output impedance), the
output characteristics of the Servo Amplifier will
be much less affected by impedance variations in the
actuator.
Single Feedback Loop
a) Another way the output circuit could be used is to
connect it tc the collector of RIO. This introduces
us to the second general configuration for majority












This would eliminate QI2, QI4, QIS, Q7, and Qg. In all,
nineteen parts would be eliminated and fourteen added,
giving a net elimination of fifteen parts for the three
Servo Amplifiers (plus 109 parts for the comparator).
This scheme would also do away with the second feedback
loop and with six stages to stabilize, could be a
problem. To make up for the open loop gain lost by
MCR-6?-239
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eli_nating Q12 and Q14, the gain of Q10 could be boosted








This gain (open loop) boost plus that already obtained
from the output circuit should just about make up for
that lost by the parts elimination. If more gain is
required or desired (to do away with the feedback pot)
a good place to get it would be in the transistor circuit
_R-67- 239
first stage, Q6. (See Fibre A-3). It i8 a good
place because any increase of gain in the first
stage or two, when their gains are low, would
greatly help the offset drift problem. Since the
nominal gain of Q6 is about 9, it could be expected
to be quite low under worst case conditions, say i
or 2. If it was desired to eliminate the DC
feedback to the base of QS, in order to increase
the open loop gain, a boost of the gain of Q6 would
then surely be required. (See Figure A-9 for Complete
Circuit, _taJority Vote Servo Amplifier No. 2).
b) Thesecond output circuit considered is a differential



































































Here again the output is taken off the collectors of a
complementary symmetry stage to give a high open loop
output impedance. This circuit has good gain and drift
characteristics. By changing _10 and _11 from PNP to
NPN, it can be used in a simple circuit (see Figure A-IO,
Majority Vote SerTo Amplifier No. 3). This arrangement
offers the most savings in piece parts, 24 for the three
amplifiers plus 109 for the Comparator Circuit. The
Open Loop gain obtainable could probably enable the
feedback pot to be eliminated, at least with fixed
resistors. With more balance in its stages, the drift
characteristics of Amplifier No. 3 will probably allow
dispensing with the DC feedback to _8. A boost in the
gain of "_ would also help. The elimination of DC
feedback increases the open loop gain, but DC feedback
could he employed if needed.
4.4 Conceptual Design Conclusion
Majority Vote Servo Amplifier No. i involves the
fewest changes with a good boost in gain. Majority Vote
Servo Amplifier No. 2 and No. 3 offer the biggest savings
in piece parts, but are the most drastic in change.
Amplifier No. 3 retains only the Magnetic Amplifier and the
differential stage (Qg) that it feeds into. The F_gnetic
Amplifier is a very handy device for differential summing
and shoUld probably be retained. The first transistor
stage coUld be made a lot simpler with a differential
Field Effect Transistor. The gates of a F_-T are not as
sensitive to unbalanced impedances as the differentail
transistor bases. Also, a simple trim resistor arrangement
in the drain circuit would not only eliminate the Pot now
used but would eliminate four resistors. Altogether eight
resistors including a Pot could probably be eliminated by
using a differential FET instead of a differential bipolar
transistor.
4.5 Protection of the Voting Node
Protection of the voting node is necessary to keep
failures of the Majority Vote Amplifier and the power




































Voting node protection is applicable to any of
the output circuits covered in this report. Twelve
parts for each Majority Vote D_aplifier would have to
be added to the parts count previously discussed. The
followiag schematic shoes the circuitry that would have
to be added. An explanation for each addition will be
given to only the top half of the circuit, since there
is symmetry.
- Redundant drive transistor, normally in saturation
but takes over the drive if _ shorts out. With-
out _the voting node would be heavily loaded if
Q2 abated.
R1, _ - Biasing resistors for
9 - Zener Diode, prevents Drive Transistor from
saturating, thus keeping the open loop output
impedance high.
D2, D3 - Diodes prevent excessive loading of voting
node if Q_ hu short from collector to base.
Also prevent excessive loading through the



















Hydraulic System Thrust Vector Control Analysis
z.o RELL_B_rrYANALYSIS
In the previous study the conversion of failure rates to










where: R : Reliability
Q = The probability of failure
t = Operating time during various mission
phases
t = Mean-time-to-failure
GFR = Generic failure rate
KA = The application factor which takes into
account the application of the piece
part with respect to the component
during component operation.
= The system function modifiers which
adjust the failure rate taking into
account the function of the component
with respect to the launch vehicle
during periods of operation being
considered.
KOp = The operating mode factor which adjusts




Driving the previous study the Generic Failure Rate
(GF R) and the Application Factor (K A) were derived for
ground, countdown, engine start andUflight. Since these
factors do not change during the coast or on-orbit phase
of the mission, the remaining factors that needed to be
determined for this study were the System Function Modifier
(K_), the Operating Mode Factor (Kop) and the time (t) of
th_ different operating modes.
Since KOp =_Kt, K, Kv, Ks )
where
Kt = _(temperature)
K - 7(atmospheric pressure)
Kv -/(vibration)
'f(shook)
The anticipated environmental conditions and flight plan of
the S-IV B stages during the coast or on-orbit phase of flight
were reviewed. With this information and data fromthe Titan
III C transtage program, the required Kop , t, and K_ factors
were derived. These factors were then i_corporated'into the
previous computer program in order to determine the probability
of failures during the coast or on-orbit phase of the S-IV B
stage operating for the previous system configurations.
MCR-67-239
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i.I Anal_sis of Time Phases (t) of the Saturn S-IV B
Stage Operation - The Saturn flight AS-204 and
AS-504 flight trajectory data in Reference 2 and
3 were reviewed in order to determine the "worst
case" trajectory with respect to orbit and engine
reignition time. It was concluded that the AS-504
flight trajectory would impose the most severe
requirement on the thrust vector control system.
The mission of the AS-504 flight is to insert
the S-IV B and payload into a circular parking
orbit with a mean altitude (at the equator) of
185.2 KM (1OO N Mi) and remain in a parking orbit
for approximately 1.5 revolutions if translunar
injection occurs at the first opportunity and
approximately 2.5 revolutions if translunar
injection occurs at the second opportunity.
Boost to translunar injection is accomplished
by a second burn of the S-IV B stage. A
tabulated summary of the parking orbit and
engine burn times for five launch azimuths are
shown in Table B-1.
It was concluded that the reliability of
the thrust vector control system should be deter-
mined for the following three major times phases:
S-IY B First Burn - .0362 hours
S-IV B Parking Orbit - .3.944 hours
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Analysis of Environmental Factors (Kop) - In the
previous study reference (i) and previous reliability
studies for the Transtage, it was established that:
KOp = Kt + K + K + K
v s p
where
Kt is a factor related to temperature
K is a factor related to vibration
V
K is a factor related to shock
8
K is a factor related to atmospheric
P
pressure
Since the Titan III C transtage mission
requirements and the thrust vector control
system hydraulic components are similar to those
of the Saturn S-IV B stage the same technique in
determining the KOp for the Titan III C transtage
was applied in thls study.
1.2.1 Temperature Factor (Kt) - From the Titan III C
Transtage analysis it was also determined that
Kt = 2 ( T1 y
where T^ is the nominal laboratory test temperature
and T 1 Is the predicted environmental temperature.
For a Type II hydraulic system the temperature
range is -65OF to 275°F.
For a Type II hydraulic system components K t = lO00
at temperatures of -65°F. Assuming the nominal
component laboratory operating temperature is lOO°F.
MCR-67-239
B-6
Kt = 2( T1 - IO0"F_ 2
At T1 = -65°F, Kt = iOOO and solving for X
2
)
This function is plotted in Figure B-I.
Examination of the actual hydraulic system
temperature obtained during the S-IV B-203 (reference 5)
orbital flight (see Figure B-2) does not
indicate adverse thermal condition of the
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Vibration Factor (Kv) - From the Titan III C
Transtage reliability analysis it was determined
that
K = lO00 for G
v rms
where a = constant
G = anticipated vibration level in g rme.
r_
For mechanical and hydraulic equipment (reference i)




Kv = 2.07 (Grms)2
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FIGURE B-3 - Kv vs. Grm s
B-f1
MCR-67-239
1.2.3 Shock Factor (Ks) - From the Titan III C Transtage
reliability analysis it was established that the
K term is
S
X : .ii05 (_ t)
S
where
g : Shock in g's
t = Time duratlon of shock loads +_-_.....




















Ambient Pressure Factor (K) - Review of the
p
Titan III C Transtage orbital flight and the
environmental tests performed on the hydraulic
system components does not show any failure
that was attributed to high altitude or the
absence of atmospheric pressure particularly
for short orbiting periods. The term K was,
therefore, considered to be negligible, p
Analysis of Function Modifier (Kf) - The system
function modifier adjusts the component generic
failure rate and takes into account the function
of the component with respect to the launch vehicle
during periods of operation under consideration.
The value of Kf varies for 0 when the hydraulic
system is not pressurized to 1 for system operation.
For this study the K_ factor was considered to be
1 during all phases :Sf th@ S-IV B stage operation
including the coast phase since the hydraulic
components would be pressurized by the motorpump
operation during the thermal conditioning of the
hydraulic system.
1.4 Analysis of Generic Failure Rate Modifiers for
the Saturn S-IV B Stage Operation - After deter-
mining the relationship between the K , K_, K ,
and K terms and their respective env[rom_entS-1
parameters and next step was to determine the
values of these terms for each hydraulic system
component based upon predicted or actual Saturn
S-I_ B stage flight data.
Table B-2 lists the shock and random vibration
levels predicted for the various hydraulic system
components of the Saturn S-IV B stage obtained
from reference 6. The maximum root-mean-square
vibration level was derived from the random




G Ji/2_ 2 s (f)d_L Zl
where G (f) = vibration acceleration density
f2 =maximum vibration frequency
fl = minimum vibration frequency
The hydraulic fluid temperatures during the
S-IV B boost and coast phase to be used for this
study was determined from references 5 and'7.
It was assumed that the hydraulic fluid temperature
at the end of the boost phase was approximately
40 °F less than predicted which would then
correlate with the temperature obtained at the
beginning of the coast phase during actual flight.
Table B-3 shows the temperature ranges and the
average temperature for the S-IV B boost and coast
phase.
The values of the K , K., K , and the resulting
V . 8
K^_ factors for the hydraulz_ components of the
S_urn S-IV B stage during S-IV B ignition, boost
phase, coast phase, and translunar injection
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The computer program derived for the previous study was
designed around an IBM 1620, Mark II computer utilizing
Fortran II-D language for communicating with the machine. After
the completion of the previous study the Martin Marietta Corp-
oration replaced the IBM 1620 computers with the GE ll30
computer. Since for this study it was necessary to modify the
previous computer program the entire computer program was con-
verted to Fortran IV language for communicating with the IBM
ll30 computer. In converting the computer program, improve-
ments were made such that the punching and transferring output
data on IBM cards between component decks were eliminated. The
computer program for this study has the capability of storing
all output data within the computator such that the transfer of
output data from the component subprograms is accomplished
automatically. Once the program is loaded into the computer
it is only necessary to read the input data into the machine.
Included in this appendix is a description of the input
data cards and a listing of the computer program.
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Normally the Truss Array (data cards 18 thru 2_I), the
Tubing Array (data cards 22 thru 37), and the Pump Bearing
Array (data cards 38 thru 95) will not change. The defin-
itions and explanation of the remaining data cards are as
follows :
The data cards 1 thru 5 are the reliability environ-






CG _ reliability modifier during ground tests
CC - reliability modifier during countdown
Data card #2 describes the reliability modifiers for the
actuator, engine truss and pumps.
Data Card #2
CSA - reliability modifier during engine start
CFA - reliability modifier during 1st burn
CYA - reliability modifier during coast
CZA - reliability modifier during 2nd burn
Data card #3 describes the reliability modifiers for the




Dat a Card #_
CSB - reliability modifier during engine start
CFB - reliability modifier during 1st burn
CYB - reliability modifier during coast
CZB - reliability modifier during 2nd burn
Data card #4 describes the reliability modifiers for the
accumulator-reservoir and filter.
Data Card #4
CSC - reliability modifier during engine start
CFC - reliability modifier during 1st burn
CYC - reliability modifier during coast
CZC - reliability modifier during 2nd burn
Data card #5 describes the reliability modifiers for the tubing
and fittings.
Dat a Card #_
CSD - reliability modifier during engine start
CFD - reliability modifier during 1st burn
CYD - reliability modifier during coast
CZD - reliability modifier during 2nd burn
Data Card #6
TORQ - required maximum torque (stall) to engine
(inch-pounds)
VELS - required maximum angular velocity (based on
loaded actuator velocity) (Radians/Second)
TRAA - required total operating angular travel (Radians)
(does not include snubbing)
c-9
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Data Card #6 - Continued
AKVEL - required open loop gain of actuator (1/Second)
EINT - engine inertia (inch-pound-second 2)
AVPR - ratio of actual valve flow rate to required valve
flow rate (loaded actuator) NOTE: this parameter
is included for the case where a miniature servo-
valve could be used but a larger valve along with
a flow limiter is actually employed.
PEEl - lowest syste_ pressureto be investigated
(pounds/inch _)
Data Card #7
DPRE - pressure inc_ement to be used during program run
(pounds/inch)
PREM - maximum systsm pressure to be investigated
(pounds/inch _)
DMOM - moment arm increment to be used during program
run (inches)
AMAX - longest moment arm to be investigated (inches)
AAAA1 - is actuator pressure feedback or derivative
pressure feedback valve used? (If answer is yes,
set AAAA1) = 1.O, if no, set to 0.0)
AAAA2 - is actuator mechanical feedback used? (If answer
is yea, set AAAA2 = 1.O, if no, set to 0.0)
AAAA3 - is actuator rod end housing used for bearing





AAAA4 - is actuator derivative pressure feedback used?
(If yea, set AAAA4 = 1.O, if no, set to 0.O)
AAAA5 - is actuator mechanical feedback used? (If yes,
set AAAA5 = 1.O, if no, set to O.O)
AAAA6 - is actuator static load error washout used?
(If yes, set AAAA6 = 1.O, if no, set to O.O)
AAAA7 - is actuator flow limiter used? (If yes, set
AAAA7 = i.O, if no, set to 0.0)
AAAA8 - are actuator snubbers used? (If yes, set AAAA8
= 1.O, if no, set to 0.O)
AAAA9 - is the actuator a new design? (If yes, set
AAAA9 = I.O, set to 0.O)
A3A10 - Does the actuator require qualification? (If
yes, set AAAI0 =l.O, if no set to 0.0)
Data Card #_
AIPAI - is the actuator direct current position instru-
mentation used? (If yes, set AIPA1 = 1.O, if
no, set to 0.0)
AIPA2 - is actuator direct current feedback used? (If
yes, set AIPA2 = 1.O, if no, set to 0.O)
AIPA3 - are actuator position switches used? (If yes,
set AIPA3 = 1.O, if no, set to 0.0)
AIPA4 - is potentiometer body required? (If yes, set
AIPA4 = 1.O, if no, set to O.0)
AK_G - fixed spring rate of engine bell (pounds/inch)
PPPIO - ratio of the required pump flow for intensifier
to system flow (unloaded actuators). The seventh




ANUMB - number of actuator per hydraulic system
ANUMV - number of actuator per system transfer valve
AMOM - shortest momentarm to be investigated (inches)
XMDC - truss dimension (inches) see Figure 1
XMDD - truss dimension (inches) see Figure 1
XMDB - truss dimension (inches) see Figure 1
XMDA - truss dimension (inches) see Figure 1
Data Cards _ll
XMDE - truss dimension (inches) see Figure 1
XXXX1 - is truss a new design? (If yes, set XXXX1 = 1.O,
if no, set to O.0)
XXXX2 - is tubing a new design? (If yes, set XXXX2 = 1.O,
if no, set to O.O)
STV1 - is transfer valve a new design? (If yes, set
STV1 = 1.O, if no, set to 0.0)
STV2 - does transfer valve require qualification? (If
yes, set STV2 = 1.O, if no, set to 0.O)
TA - tube length from ground checkout pump to system
pump (inches)





- tube length from filter to reservoir-accumulator
(inches)
TB
- tube length from reservoir-accumulator to transfer
valve (inches)
TE
- tube length from transfer valve to actuator
(inches)
PPPP1 - ratio of the maximum required pump _ow r_te
(for fixed angle pump)to maximum system flow rate
(unloaded actuators)
PPPP2 - is fixed angle pump a new design? (If yes, set
PPPP2 = 1.O, if no, set to 0.0)
PPPP_ - does fixed angle pump required qualification?
(If yes, set PPPP3 = 1.O, if no, set to 0.0)
PPPP4 - is wobble plate pump a new design? (If yes,
set PPPP4 = 1.0, if no, set to 0.0)
Data Card #I 7
PPPP5 - does wobble plate pump require qualification?
(If yes, set PPPP5 = 1.O, if no, set to 0.0)
PPPP6 - is intensifier a new design? (If yes, set
PPPP6 = 1.O, if no, set to 0.0)
PPPP7 - does intensifier require qualification? (If
yes, set PPPP7 = 1.O, if no, set to 0.0)
ANGLI - angle of fixed angle pump (radians)




PUMSI - fixed angle pump speed (revolutions per second)
PUMS2 - wobble plate pump speed (revolutions per second)
S5 - is compensator used in fixed angle pump? (If yes,
set $5 = 1.0, if no, set to O.O)
s6
- is compensator used in wobble plate pump? (If yes,
set $6 = 1.0, if no set to 0.0)
FFFF2 - ratio of required filter flow to the maximum
actuator flow (unloaded actuators)
FFFF3 - is filter a new design? (If yes, set FFFF3 = 1.O,
if no, set to 0.0)
FFFF4 - does filter require qualification? (If yes, set
FFFF4 = 1.O, if no, set to 0.0)
Data Card _
ACCU - when accumulator is used by itself (set ACCU =
1.O, if not, set to 0.0)
REAC - when reservoir-accumulator are used separate.
(set REAC = 1.0, if not, set to 0.0)
SSSI - is accumulator used? (If yes, set SSSI = 1.0,
if no, set to 0.0)
SSS2 - ratio of return pressure to system pressure if
return pressure is a function of system pressure
SSS3 - return pressure as fixed actual value if the
return pressure is to be held constant (pounds/
inch")
RSPAI - is direct current position instrumentation used in
the reservoir? (If yes, set RSPA1 = 1.O, if no,
set to 0.0)
RSPA2 - is position switch used in reservoir? (If yes,




RSPA3 - is potentiometer body integral part of the
reservoir? (If yes, set RSPA3 = 1.O, if no,
set to O.0)
TOILW - hydraulic fluid density used in system (pounds per
cubic inch)
RRRR1 - ratio of total volume of fluid supplied by the
accumulator to the total volume of fluid consumed
by all actuators when traveling full stroke
RRRR3 - is reservoir and/or accumulator a new design? (If
yes, set RRRR3 = 1.O, if no, set to O.O)
RRRR4 - does reservoir and/or accumulator require qualification?
(If yes, set RRRR4 = 1.O, if no, set to 0.0)
QQQQ1 - is quick disconnect a new design? (If yes, set
QQQQ1 = 1.o, if no, set to o.o)
QQQQ2 - does quick disconnect require qualification? (If
yes, set QQQQ2 = 1.o, if no, set to o.o)
Data Card #17
QQQQ3 - ratio of quick disconnect rated flow to the maximum
system flow rate (unloaded actuators)
VNA_ - required actuator system natural frequency with all
springs included (radians/second)
Data Card #96
TT1 - ground operating time (see note on data card 98)
TT2 - countdown time (see note on data card 98)
TT4 - flight operating time (see note on data card 98)
VLIFA - required life of a single actuator includes total




Data Card #96 - (Continued)
VLIFP - required life of a single pump. Includes total
running time - ground checkout, flight, etc.,
(hours)
VHYSB - total number of independent hydraulic systems to
be used for the particular stage of the vehicle
VTEST - total number of tests required for a single hydraulic
system under investigation
Data Card #97
VFLRF - cost of flight failure
VPNUB - total number of launch vehicles within the program
_CST - the cost of one pound of weight for a particular
stage being investigated (dollars per pound)
VCYCA - required life of a single actuator in total number
of cycles - ground checkout, flight, etc.(cycles)
VDEVL - total time allowed to develop the complete hydraulic
system. Equal to the total time from contract go-
ahead until a qualified system is delivered (weeks)
VPEND - dollar penalty per week for delays in development
time for the complete system (dollars per week)
VOPER - required time for average hydraulic test on the
system under consideration (hours)
Data Card #98
VTCST - total cost of average test performed on a single
hydraulic system under investiKation (dollars per
test)
VREPR - average ratio of component repair cost to initial
component cost
ANUMP - number of actuators main pumps




Data Card #99 (98 + RUNQ)











airborne pump used set PPFP8 = O.O, fixed angle
pump used set PPPP8 = 1.O, wobble plate pump used
set PPPP8 = 2.0)
- number of fixed angle p_mps per hydraulic system
- number of wobble plate pumps per hydraulic system
- number of intensifiers per hydraulic system
- number of accumulators per hydraulic system
- number of reservoirs per hydraulic system
- number of reservoir-accumulator and filters per
hydraulic system
- actuator configuration; JQ = 1 standard, JQ = 2
majority vote, JQ = 2 tandem
- system, configuration; KQ = 1 single, KQ = 2 dual
- pump configuration"
- number of run
•LQ = 1 - intensifier primary power source, fixed angle
pump auxilliary power source
LQ = 2 - intensifier primary power source, fixed wobble
plate pump auxilliary power source
LQ = 3 - fixed angle pump primary power source, fixed wobble
plate pump auxilliary power source
LQ = 4 - fixed wobble plate pump primary power source,




1.2 METHODS FOR STUDYING ALTERNATE REDUNDANT CONFIGURATIONS
The computer program has the capability of evaluating any of
the three basic types of actuators for either a single or dual
hydraulic system. It is only necessary to change card 99 to
complete a study of these configurations.
The type of actuator is determined by setting JQ to l, 2,
or 3,
A change to the dual power supply system can also be made by
changing KQ from 1 to 2. Also the appropriate primary power supply
and accumulator-reservoir quantities must be altered to reflect a
change in KQ from 1 to 2.
One limitation to the number of configurations which can be
investigated without re-running all the component decks does exist.
The initial data inputs, cards 6 through ll, size the pumps on a
proportional quantity of the maximum actuator flow. Thus, when a
certain type pump is sized for ground checkout, it can not be
resized for flight since the individual component programs will record
data for only one size of each pump at any one time. To change the
type pump used for flight it is necessary to re-run the complete com-
ponent program with the appropriate flow change. However, an inten-
sifier which would be used only for flight power generation, can be
sized during the initial component calculations and can be investigated
by changing only card 99.
C-18
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1.3 Computer Program Listin_
The following is a listing of the component and subroutine
programs which form the overall final study program. The defin-
ition of the terms used in the program are given in reference 1.
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READ (2w600) PPPP8p S7p S8t S9eZleZ2e Z3e.J@PKGeLGpM@
WRITE (1-IDATA) PPPP8pS7tS8,SgwZleZ2pZ3e.JepKGeL@eM@










500000. .1395 .2_@5 18.0 17@00.
500. 3500, 1.0 12,0 1,0
1,0 1.0 0.0 0,0 0,0
1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 222700.
2.0 2.0 II.0 6.31 27.8
_,5 1.0 1.0 1,0 0.0
12,0 12.0 108.0 0.1 1.0
1.0 1.0 1,0 0,@ .262
243,0 117,0 1,0 1,0 .2
0.0 1.0 1.0 .0135 10.0
























2.8E-2 3.2E-2 3.5E-2 @.2E-2
3.2E-2 3.5E-2 _.2E-2 O.OE+O
'3,5E-2 _,2E-2 _,9E-2 5,8E-2
3=5E-2 @.2E-2 _.9E-2 5.8E-2
3,5E-2 4,2E-2 4.9E-2 5,8E-2
3.5E-2 4,2E-2 4.9E-2 5,8E-2
3.5E-2 4,2E-2 4.9E-2 5,8E-2
_.9E-2 5,_E-2 6.5E-2 7,2E-2
_,9E-2 5.8E-2 6.5E-2 7,2E-2
@.9E-2 5._E-2 6,5E-2 7,2E-2
_,9E-2 5._E-2 6.5E-2 7,2E-2
6,5E-2 7.2E-2 8.3E-2 9.5E-2
b,5E-2 7,2E-2 8.3E-2 9,5E-2




























































































































































































































































































































































































d REPLACED WITH Z















































50 DIAT = 2.*(DIAM+(I,-2,*Z)*WlDH)
HWT=.O574*DIAT*WIDH*WlDH
ZZ=DIAT*ALPH*WIDH*(I.-,5*ALPH)














































C STORED PROGRAM 1




















































OQAIA=AV2FA +q,O_AV2CA +2,0*AV2BA +AV2KA +AV2MA +,O0007/AV2FV
.I +AV2FA+.OO261/AV2FJ



























































1CA +.O008+.0182*AV1DA +.36W*AV1DA +.35*AVIMI
O0248*AV12J+AVllA +2,02*AV12A +.000322/(AVLII)
+°I*AV1HA +°O000026/(AV1MC)+AV1FA +AVIOA +.5,











































































QA2A=QA2A+2.0*AVHJA +.O982*AVMJA +AVMAA +AAAA2*.OOO202/AVMAW**.335






















































































































































































































































































































QAIA=OAIA+(ABPBA +AVDIA +2.02*AV12A +,O00322/AVIII)*(AAAA_+AAAA6)














QAII:eAIIe(.UI,AVDIA +.80B*AVI2A +,9*ABPBA )*(AAAA_+AAAA6)















































































































































































































































































QASZ = QA3F*CZA/CFA .
QAMF : I, -(1,-QAIF)*(1,-QA3F)*(I,-QH2F)*(I.-QN2F)
QAMY = i,.-(I,-QAIY)*(I,-QA3Y)*(I,-QH2Y)*(I,-QN2Y)


































































































































































































XUSS8 =XUSSG *VFAC4 I
XUSSH =XUSSH *VFAC4 I



























































STRSS =STRSS +3,*RFRS i
























































































































































































































































































































• STORE WS UA pUMPZ
eq
C-49










































DUMI= .I_PAPCA + .02/(FLOW_PRES/PUMS)*_.33
QPBA1 = QPBAI +DUM1 + ,0012
QPIA_ = QPIA2 ÷3._DUM1 +,000_





























































































































































































































OQPAW=PWBBA +PWPEA *9.+RFRG+9.*(3.8E-3*PWBRA +.9*PWPEA )+$6-9.*
l(.O127*PWBBA )+S6..05+5.9,PWPEA










































































































































































































































































































l+.33*FOHPA +.167*FDBLA +O.428*FDBOA +.O0077/FIBOW**.33
2+.333,FIBAA +16.8/PRES+FOHPA +FDBKA +FDBLA +FIBAA +,1265
3+l.85E-4*FLOW
OFILRB=2.27E-5*FLOW/FOBOW_.OIO30/FOBOJ+.5*FOBOA +.064/FLOW
1+.033,FOHPA +,0167*FDBLA +.O00384/(FIBOW**.33 )+.0333*FIBAA


































































































































RASAA =SPAPA +SPGNA +RFRG*I.O5*SSSI*REAC+SPAGA



















_ASAb =RASA_ +HFRC*_.O2*SSSI*REAC+SHPCA *.5
IIASAC =RASAC +RFRS*I.025*SSSI*REAC+SHPCA *.I
RASAD :RASAD +RFRF*l.025*SSSI*REAC+SHPCA *,05
I_ASAK :RASAK +RFRS*l.025*sSSI*REAC÷SHPCA *.I










1SPAPL, (SPAPI**2.-SPAGI**2. ))*ACCU+ {(2. 5970E-?* ((1.256*SPAPI-
22,12b)**2.-2,1**2.)*PRES/(1.256*SPAPI-2.125))+,O848+.46383*
3SPAPI)*ACCU

















RESAA =RESAA +RFRG*I.333+RCASA +.O00i*RPRE








RESAB =RESAB +RFRC_3.+RHXXA _.5
RESAC =RESAC +RFRS_.+RHXXA _.1875
RESAD =RESAO +RFRF_3,+RHXXA _,09375
RESAI =RESA_ +RHXXA _.0625



























































*S_ORE WS UA RESAC
c-64
















950 FORMAT(1HI,////P20XP24H COMPUTER PROGRAM NUMBER,I5//pI?H PUMP COMB
IIHATIONPI5pTXwI2HPOWER SYSTEMwI5t?XPI9HACTUATOR REDUNDANCY,15,///)
951 FORMAT (16H SYSTEM PRESSURE,F9.0t4H PSIPIOXPIIH MOMENT ARM,
I F9._P?H INCHES//,27X,24HPROBABILITIES OF FAILURE,34X6HWEIGHT,/
2 13X6HGROUNDSXgHCOUNTDOWNSXSHSTARTSXSHFLIGHT 16X5HCOAST5XBHFLIGHT
325X6HPOUNDS)
605 FORMAT (9H SYSTEM ,6F12.8,FIO.2,/p9H ACTUATOR,6FI2.8,FIO.2,/P




















































































































































































































































































































QTOTA =I,-(1,-QPRIM _QSECT)_(1,-QPRIM _QTvT)_(1,-QTANC)
QACT=I,-(1,-QTANP_QTANS)*(1,-QTANP_QTVF)*(1,-QTANC)
WTOTA =A_(WATW+WT)+2,_WAA+WT-(QDWGW+PUWTA)









































































































*STORE WS UA QDECK
,QI,e2,Q3
"- --,.
